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Abstract. Inspired by Gambetta’s theory on the origins of the mafia in Sicily, 
we report a geo-concentrating phenomenon of scams in China, and propose a 
novel economic explanation. Our analysis has some policy implications. 
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1 Introduction 
Various scams and cybercrime have hit China hard in the recent dec-
ade. Notably, seven regions, scattered across the country, were notori-
ous for being scammer hyperactive, and in 2015 the national law en-
forcement publically announced these regions as high-priority targets in 
their crackdown of scam and cybercrime.  
A look at the notorious scam regions reveals the following. First, they 
spread across seven provinces including Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Hebei, Hainan, Hunan, and Jiangxi, and the notorious regions are not 
geographically adjacent. A map will be included here for readers who 
are not familiar with the geography of China. Second, it is not that eve-
ryone in each notorious region was a scammer, but a village or a few in 
the region was scammer rich, which we call ‘scam villages’. Third, the 
density of scammers in the ‘scam villages’ was high. For example, re-
portedly, 50% household of a couple of villages participated in scams, 
and hundreds of scammers were arrested there [10]. Fourth, the scam 
economy appeared to be a major trade for each of the scam villages. 
The scammers made a good living by preying on victims across the 
country via Internet or telecomm services.  
                                                 
* Presented at the 27th International Workshop on Security Protocols (Trinity College, Cam-
bridge, UK; 10-12 April 2019). Comments and suggestions are more than welcome. 
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Of particular interest, we observe a geo-concentration phenomenon of 
scams. Namely, a number of villages made a living as scammers; while 
abundant scammers were inside the villages, the number of scammers 
quickly diminished outside the village borders. We are not naively sug-
gesting that no scammers exist outside of these villages, but the density 
of scammers inside the villages and outside differed phenomenally.  
Criminology literature can explain to an extent this geo-concentration 
phenomenon, e.g. the differential association theory [8], which provides 
a subcultural perspective to explain the wide spreading of criminal be-
havior; and techniques of neutralization [9], which theorise a series of 
psychological methods that criminals employ to switch off their inner 
moral controls.   
These theories might suggest that the wide spreading of the scams in a 
village was the consequence of human interactions. Individuals learned 
the values, attitudes and techniques for criminal behavior, through in-
teracting with others in the village. Importantly, they learned from oth-
ers not only the knowledge and skills required for executing each scam, 
but also neutralization techniques needed to keep their own inner peace. 
Individuals adopted the neutralizing techniques to ‘suspend’ negative 
values attached to a certain behaviour and normalize it. This way, un-
ethical and illicit behaviours were legitimized and justified by the indi-
viduals, and by the group as a whole.  
Here, we attempt to develop an alternative explanation of the phenome-
non, from the perspective of economics rather than criminology. Our 
focus is not about explaining the formation procedure of the scam vil-
lages, but the economic force and rationale behind their formation and 
existence. 
2 Related work 
Gambetta [5] developed an interesting theory explaining the origins of 
mafia in Sicily. In his theory, the mafia emergence was a perverse re-
sponse to a rapid transition to the market economy in the early 19th 
century, when a demand suddenly surged for the protection of the 
newly granted property and property rights. While security provided by 
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the state was scarce and banditry widespread, a supply of disbanded 
soldiers from the Bourbon army and unemployed guards who used to 
worked for the feudal lords, emerging just about the same time, met the 
rising demand of protection; they started to offer private protection as a 
business, giving rise to the Sicilian mafia. 
Bandiera [2] further developed Gambetta’s property rights theory of 
mafia emergence. Her analyses suggested that it was optimal for every 
landowner in Sicily to voluntarily purchase protection from the mafia, 
even if this would lead to an inferior equilibrium for the landowning 
class as a whole, and that all things equal, mafia would profit more and 
develop better where land was more fragmented.  
Farrell [4] noticed that ‘“Crime has a tendency to concentrate in time, 
space, and other dimensions along which it occurs’, and surveyed con-
cepts and terms reflecting various crime concentration theories, includ-
ing repeat offending, repeat and near repeat victimization, crime 
hotspots, hot products, hot dots, hot places, hot targets, super-targets, 
risky facilities, risky routes, and crime sprees and spates. While these 
are interesting and useful, they are orthogonal to what we intend to 
achieve in this paper.  
Levitt and Venkatesh [7] analysed gang economics with a rare dataset 
obtained from a drug-selling street gang in the USA. They found that 
compensation within the gang was highly skewed, and they argued that 
the prospect of future riches, instead of current wages, was the primary 
economic motivation for most gangsters. They also suggested that eco-
nomic factors alone were unlikely to adequately explain individual par-
ticipation in the gang. 
A news article by Wang [10] looked at one of the scam regions in 
China, but it did not formulise the geo-concentration phenomenon or 
provide an economic explanation.  
Gambetta’s study of mafia emergence [5], together with Wang’s piece 
[10], was a major inspiration for us. We don’t apply Gambetta’s theory 
in our analysis, but we similarly aim to explain a crime phenomenon 
from an economic perspective. On the other hand, Wang provided a 
few key clues to the jigsaw puzzle that our analysis will piece together. 
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3 An economic explanation  
3.1 The phenomenon: a closer look  
Some patterns emerge when we pay a closer look at the phenomenon of 
‘scam villages’.  
First, it occurred only in rural areas, but never in urban communities.  
Second, each of the seven regions gained notoriety particularly for a 
distinctive scam. There appeared to be a clear division of labor, and 
each of the regions specialised in a particular scam.  
Third, these seven representative scams have a clear pattern. 1) To pull 
off each of the scams, collaborative team efforts were required. Just 
like the ‘police investigation scam’ [13] we analysed before, a number 
of scammers operated in a team, each playing a different role, e.g. ex-
tracting victims’ personally identifiable information (PII); exploiting 
technical mechanisms to reach potential victims, and when necessary, 
to spoof legitimate phones and websites; mind-manipulating victims 
via impersonation, deception and other psychological tricks; withdraw-
ing money which victims transferred via banks. 2) A lot of efforts were 
required of the scammers before a victim became hooked to transfer 
money to them, and for the scammers, the economic yield was near the 
end of each case. Therefore, both collaboration and trust were required 
within a team. 3) Not all people targeted by the scammers eventually 
became a victim that was deceived to lose money. Some targets might 
narrowly escape from falling into victims near the last minute, and oth-
ers might realise the scam earlier. It could take time and effort to catch 
a real victim. 4) Compared to starting up other business, each of the 
scams was relatively low-cost and lucrative. And it was duplicable. 5) 
The scams could not be executed in a completely automatic way or 
without human involvement. Oral communications with victims were 
needed. Although the scammers could more or less follow a script in 
their interaction with victims, spontaneous reactions were necessary. 
Fourth, not merely a single team, but many teams, were operating the 
same scam in each of the concerned villages. However, the other vil-
lages, geographically adjacent or nearby, might be just normal and they 
did not home a large number of scammers at all. 
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The particular geo-concentration feature of the phenomenon that we at-
tempt to explain can be clarified as follows. The practice of a particular 
scam was propagated inside a village significantly enough to an extent 
that the density of scammers in the village was high, but the propaga-
tion diminished outside the physical boundary of the villages.  
Why so? 
3.2 An analysis 
While everyone is selfish (as per the fundamental assumption of eco-
nomics), savvy scammers who first recognised the profitability of a 
scam and started a team operation might be willing to share their trade 
with others due to economic incentives, e.g. if they could benefit from 
this sharing behavior, and in particular if the (economic) benefit of 
sharing could significantly outperform that of keeping the trade within 
their single team.  
Under what conditions would the savvy scammers share their trade 
with others? Let us look into some plausible specifics.  
First, the market of the scam economy was large enough. There should 
be many more victims in the wild than their own team could cope with 
single-handedly. If the team’s income was reduced as a consequence of 
sharing the trade with others, they would rather keep it to themselves to 
rake competitive or monopolistic advantages. Or, if the market scale 
was merely enough to sustain a single team or even smaller, they would 
not share at all. On the other hand, new teams started with the savvy 
scammer’s help could make a profit for themselves, too. 
Clearly, China means an opportunity for a large scam economy to form, 
due to its vast population of 1.3 billion people, the same language used 
among them, the same culture shared, and a fast-growing economy in 
the country.  
Second, the range of sharing was not unlimited. If everybody became 
able to do the trade and did it, the average income of the scammers 
would decrease due to increased competition. Some barriers should be 
in place to keep the sharing range within a limit, so that the scammers 
could maintain a competitive edge in the scam economy.  
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Third, the economic return of sharing the trade with others was enforce-
able in practice. The difficulty of enforcing economic returns included 
the following. 1) This context was all about illegal activities, where 
people involved would not be naive to rely on law enforcement or the 
like to enforce their expected return. 2) A key property for a scam team 
was their knowledge about the scam, i.e. know-hows and sort of ‘trade 
secrets’ – not as confidential in the sense of Coca-Cola recipe, but their 
confidentiality matters†, since the value of these knowledge diminishes 
quickly if too many scammers have learned it. However, knowledge 
sharing is physically non-revocable. 3) Transaction costs can be high 
for enforcing the rights of trade secrets and business know-hows, even 
in a legitimate world where legal means and facilities are readily avail-
able. These costs could rise to a prohibitively high in an illegitimate 
world. 4) To enforce the property rights‡ involved, trust and control 
was essential between the sharing partners. 
Last, if a reasonable mechanism was in place to allow controlled shar-
ing with enforceable return, the savvy scammers could exploit it to 
maximise self-gain.  
An option, readily available to the scammers, was ties of blood and pa-
triarchal clan (宗族). Loosely speaking, a patriarchal clan was an ex-
tended kinship group of people with the same surname and lineage (or 
being genealogically related by marriage), worshiping the same ances-
tors, and following the Confucian ethical code and customs (e.g. filial 
piety). The patriarchal clan formed a strong solidarity for members; it 
protected them against economic adversities, and against outside dis-
crimination or grievance. In the meanwhile, the clan maintained a 
strong exclusivity to non-members.  
                                                 
† It is in the scammers’ interest to keep their tricks confidential, for another simple reason: if 
everybody knows the tricks, nobody will fall into victims of the scams.   
‡ “A property right is the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used”, as defined 
by [1]. Property rights of an economic good or resource include a bundle of rights, including 
the right to use it, the right to earn income from it, the right to transfer it to others, and the 
right to enforce property rights. 
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For hundreds of years, from the imperial times through the Republican 
period up to the rise of the communist regime in 1949, the patriarchal 
clan system was the most important institution to understand rural 
China. Villages were the basic unit of Chinese rural society, and the 
clan system was the basic institution through which the villages were 
administrated and run. The villages were often named after the clan 
which was exclusively or dominantly represented in the villages.  
As observed by scholars like Max Weber [12] and John King Fairbank 
[3], traditional social structure in China had some remarkable features: 
the central ruling power of the state never reached below the level of 
county (县), and the rural society was (largely) self-governed by the pa-
triarchal clans in the villages. These clans were ‘nourished at the grass-
roots level by the principle of filial piety, whose great local strength 
and gentry leadership make them a match, and even more than a match, 
for the officials who briefly sojourn among them’ [11]. 
In short, a clan carried the responsibility for administrative, political, 
economic, educational, policing, defensing, and other functions. It also 
had the unquestionable authority to lay down the law for its members, 
and it could exercise power to order civil death or punitive exile (driven 
out of the village).  
The land reform led by Mao Zedong’s communist revolution entirely 
eradicated this patriarchal clan system across the country, by outlawing 
its organization, eliminating its gentry leadership physically, and for-
bidding its activities of any sort. Instead, a multi-layer administrative 
hierarchy was for the first time in the history of China installed below 
the county level to govern the rural society for the post-1949 era.  
Although patriarchal clans were effectively stopped by the political 
movements, both their organization and activity forbidden, the biologi-
cal ties of blood and lineage among people were there all the time. 
Most members of a particular clan often settled in physically nearby, 
and usually together in a village -- this important pattern of residence 
remained, too.  
Therefore, the savvy scammers could readily make use of the ties of 
blood and patriarchal clan. This kinship network embodied a social 
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structure, offering both solidarity (to members) and exclusivity (to non-
members). And it could work as a natural mechanism of trust and con-
trol. The scammers could rely on it to reduce transaction costs of defin-
ing, allocating, monitoring and enforcing property rights. 
In essence, the geo-concentration phenomenon can be explained in eco-
nomics terms as follows. 
First, this is a phenomenon of controlled sharing, which ensures both a 
limit of the sharing range and a practical enforceability of economic re-
turns from sharing a trade with others. The kinship social network pro-
vided a means of enforcing (intellectual) property rights such as scam 
know-hows and trade secrets between the scammers.  
The savvy scammers were better-off by sharing their trade than keeping 
the trade secret to themselves; their reward from sharing could be 
multi-fold, including economic gain (either directly from the increased 
income or from the reduced expenditure in helping with relatives), or in 
the form of reputation, respect or social status in their social network.  
This sharing practice stopped where the enforceability of its economic 
returns became week, e.g. typically along the physical border of the vil-
lages. The other villages, adjacent or nearby, usually belonged to a dif-
ferent kinship social network.  
The savvy scammers could maximise self-gains by 1) scaling up 
productivity and profitability through sharing the trade, 2) controlling 
the extent of sharing, by limiting the knowledge propagation via a 
trusted kinship social network only, to prevent the economic value of 
their knowledge diminishing from a nearly monopoly to an unaccepta-
ble low, and 3) maintaining a practical enforceability of expected eco-
nomic return from sharing the trade with trusted partners.  
3.3 Evidence 
We offer some evidence to support our analysis.  
The propagation of knowledge and skills of a particular scam across the 
kinship social network increased the welfare of not only individuals 
and families who received the knowledge and skills, but also those giv-
ers. Inevitably, this propagation process had done more than activating 
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the kinship ties, but reinforced them. Therefore, if the resurgence of pa-
triarchal clans is observed in the scam villages, that will support our 
theory. Specifically, if activities of the clan nature in the concerned vil-
lage reached an intensity level that was higher than the average, this ob-
servable fact can corroborate our theory as a reliable evidence.  
Indeed a journalist suggested in [10] that the patriarchal-clan organiza-
tions did emerge, and substantial activities of that nature were ob-
served, in the few scam villages which the author paid attention to. An 
official publication of the national law enforcement [6] even suggested 
that the clan activities became alarmingly intense in the villages.  
Nowadays the official authorities in some regions have started to turn a 
blind eye to certain activities of the patriarchal clan nature, those con-
sidered to pose less of a threat to the government, such as compiling 
genealogical records (which are an important document for each clan), 
rebuilding ancestral halls (the temples) and organising worship rituals. 
But the scam villages went way beyond these. Councils and executive 
committees were set up within a clan, and elected leadership emerged. 
These committees were independent from and in parallel to the official 
administration authority, and the former often took effective charge of 
the villages. Organised resistance was staged to mitigate the crack-
downs led by the law enforcement. For some time, the clans had made 
it difficult or even impossible for the police to get inside the villages 
making arrests [6]. Clearly, these activities were beyond the red line 
that the government could tolerate with.  
It was also observed that some key scammers served in the leadership 
committees of their clan. Their rise in social status within the clan was 
evidently a non-monetary reward from sharing their scam trade with 
fellow villagers.  
As additional evidence to support our theory, it was documented in [10] 
that less competent teams were helped by more sophisticated ones to 
collaboratively work on challenging but potentially lucrative targets. 
And they would share any yield squeezed successfully from the targets. 
This sort of collaboration makes a lot of economic sense, when false 
positives and true positives are taken into consideration. 
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Not all people targeted by scammers will yield anything. If we say false 
positives are targets that are attacked but yield nothing, then true posi-
tives are targets successfully attacked. A key issue in the scammers’ 
business model is to control the ratio and the relative cost of true and 
false positives. The cooperation of less competent teams and more so-
phisticated ones could effectively improve the ratio of true and false 
positives, which was win-win for both teams. 
We would not be surprised if some scammers helped new teams to start 
up so that they could benefit financially in a form of shareholding in the 
new teams’ scam business, i.e. a certain percent of profit raked by the 
latter was paid to the former as a dividend of sharing their trade. Simi-
larly, we would not be surprised if a team procured sick replacements 
from another team. However, no public resources confirm or rebuke 
these predictions, yet. 
Several facts explain why this geo-concentration phenomenon occurred 
only in rural areas, but not in cities. First, it is not that people in urban 
communities ignore the ties of blood and patriarchal clans, but this kin-
ship bond is significantly weaker in the city than in the countryside. 
Second, the demographic differs. In the cities, it is rare for people from 
the same patriarchal clan to settle in physically nearby, and rare for 
them to settle in at an area as isolated as a village. Third, within the city 
wall, it has been governed by the central power of the state, and the pa-
triarchal clans have never dominated there, even in the imperial times.  
3.4 Why didn’t ‘scam villages’ form elsewhere? 
It is because the formation of this phenomenon requires a combination 
of conditions, including: 1) scammers who are smart enough to figure 
out that scalability trumps ‘keeping the trade to myself’, 2) a mecha-
nism in place that not only controls the range of sharing, but also effec-
tively enforces the property rights involved, 3) law enforcement that are 
uninformed of, or unprepared for modern scams, or being corrupt or 
corruptible, and 4) an environment that is lack of other opportunities 
for making a good living. 
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4 Conclusions 
The ‘scam villages’ represent a form of economic enterprise. It was 
built upon an alternative system of property rights which the scammers 
figured out and adopted to expand their scam business, when legally 
enforceable contracts or property rights were impossible, due to the il-
licit nature of their operation. 
The ties of blood and patriarchal clans, deeply rooted in Chinese rural 
society for centuries, provided a mechanism of trust and control. The 
scammers exploited this mechanism to not only propagate and share 
their scam knowledge and skills across the kinship social network, but 
also prevent further sharing and propagation.  
In the meanwhile, the ties facilitated a mechanism for reducing the 
transaction costs of delineating, monitoring and enforcing property 
rights from a prohibitively high, making it viable to practically enforce 
the rights among the scammers on the same kindship social network.  
The property rights concerned in this context were way beyond intellec-
tual property rights of scam ‘trade secrets’ and know-hows that started 
a team up and running, but could include rights to the proceeds 
squeezed from a victim on which multiple teams worked collabora-
tively to achieve a success, rights to the proceeds contributed by sick-
replacement labor, and so on.  
In this ‘scam village’ form of economic enterprise, many insiders in the 
village were able to join the business to share the economic benefit al-
lowed by the sufficiently large scam economy, whereas outsiders were 
excluded. Apparently this arrangement protected the insiders’ interest 
and prevented potential competition from the outsiders, simultaneously. 
We have observed some evidence that supports our analysis. Therefore, 
our economic explanation is more than merely hypothetical, but par-
tially empirical.  
As the renowned economist Armen A. Alchian nicely put,  “The defini-
tion, allocation, and protection of property rights comprise one of the 
most complex and difficult sets of issues that any society has to resolve, 
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but one that must be resolved in some fashion” [1]. Apparently, people 
in the scam villages had figured out their own way. 
Our analysis has some policy implications. The scam villages are a 
form of crime where some people have a bigger role or reward, than the 
others. The law enforcement should identify the few key criminals and 
hit them hard with a first priority.  
Arguably, the formation of each scam village also created a network ef-
fect for itself. The scammers in the village competed with each other, 
and they also collaborated in one way or another. As more people 
joined this network, the strength of the network kept increasing – the 
scammers improved their skills on a particular form of scam every day, 
significantly increasing the competitive edge of them as a whole in the 
scam economy. This continuous self-reinforcement process might ex-
plain why people in each of the seven notorious regions largely special-
ised in a particular scam. Staying competitive – it was the market force 
that was working. It was a specialised division of labor.  
This might also explain a paradox: as more and more people in the vil-
lage joined the scam economy, the competition between themselves in-
creased, very likely leading to a decreased average income for everyone 
involved; but why more and more insiders were allowed to join force 
afresh? Our explanation is the following. The increased competence of 
the village as a whole in a particular scam allowed a relatively large 
number of insiders to join the business by outperforming the compe-
tence of outsiders to reduce their participation in the same scam.  
In a sense, some scammers stayed close, simply because they were born 
close. Staying close, they also became stronger.  
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